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RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
IN THE ANCIENT GREEK LAW OF PROCEDURE 
Gerhard Thür* 
Scholarship is rational. Life is irrational and full of emotion. This paper, I dedicated to 
my friend Laurens, will be on rationality and irrationality in the ancient Greek law of 
procedure. When did the Greeks start deciding legal disputes in a rational way? What 
did judgements look like before that? After the publication of the masterly book by 
E.R. Dodds, the topic "the Greeks and the irrational" has boomed. Nevertheless, the 
legal aspect has been disregarded. The same may be said ofthe leamed contributions on 
"rationality in Greek thought" in Frede/Striker (1996). In my opinion what is rational 
or irrational is largely in the eye of the beholder: what people at that time may have 
considered a completely rational type of adjudication, today seems irrational. Besides, 
those people might not always have been aware ofthe consequences ofinnovations that 
were introduced into the system. 
I shall concentrate on Draco 's law on homicide dating back to 621-620 B.C.2 It is the 
oldest known Greek statute on bloodshed and its prosecution. At the time ofthe general 
revision of laws in Athens in 409-408 B.C. , it was copied from wooden blocks, axones,3 
onto a marble stele. This stele was found in the 1880s in a poor state of preservation. 
However, quotations from speeches made in Athenian courts of the fifth and fourth 
century s.c. allow a partial reconstruction, now edited in the Inscriptiones Graecae (JG 
P 104).4 
I present a slightly enlarged and modified version ofa paper presented at the International Conference: 
lus esl ars boni el aequi, Southern African Society of Legal Historians, Pilanesberg 12-16 May 2013. 
I grateful1y acknowledge some comments an,' suggestions made by Laurens, who discussed this 
topic with me seve ral times and brought to my attention Dodds, ER., The Greeks and the Irrational 
Berkeley, 195 1, and Frede/Striker (eds.), Ralionalily in Greek Thought Oxford, 1996. 
2 For more detail s see my forthcoming article " Prozesseide im Gesetz Drakons und ihr Nachleben 
im klassischen Athen" in : Barta (ed.), 6. Innsbrucker Tagung 'Lebend(ig)e Rechtsgeschichte ', 
Prozeßrecht und Eid: Recht und Rechtsfindung in antiken Kulturen - Velfahrensrecht als erstes 
Zivilisierungsprojekt - Zur Teleologie rechtlicher Verfahren. 
3 See Davis, Gil, "Axones and Kurbeis : A New Answer to an Old Problem" 2011 Historia 60: 1-35. 
4 From 1981 , based on Stroud, Ronald, Drakon s Law of Homicide Berkeley, 1968 : 5. 
Dr. Oe h.c. mull. , Professor Emeritus of Roman Law "Documenta Antiqua - Ancient Legal History", 
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna. 
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My studies on Draco form part ofresearch I have been doing since 1970 in the law of 
procedure in the archaic Greek polis.5 In my view, Draco's law represents an intermediate 
stage: on the one hand, it is based on the ancient irrational tradition dating from a time 
when the outcome of litigation was not decided by courtjudgements, but rather by oaths 
imposed by the courts and sworn by the parties. On the other hand, in Draco's law we 
find formal voting by a panel of judges, which was the nucleus of rational decision-
making in classical Athens. Scholars have not as yet grasped the great importance of 
Draco's step in the direction ofrationality, a step that has influenced western legal culture 
up to the present day. 
In archaic Greek poleis, purgatory oaths imposed by a law court were very weil 
known. By simply swearing, the defendant could refute the plaintiff's claim. In my 
opinion, this was then the normal method of settling disputes.6 Was this method rational 
or irrational? Today the answer has to be that it was highly irrational. The final verdict 
depended only on the defendant's fear of the gods he was invoking in the oath formula. 
If he perjured hirnself, he had to fear that the gods would subsequently punish hirn and 
perhaps all his offspring. Nevertheless, in archaic times when people generally did 
believe that the gods interfered directly in their lives, the method seemed to be a rational 
one: no defendant would risk a purgatory oath if he really were guilty. At least social 
control might discourage hirn. 
The personal skill of archaic judges consisted in finding the correct divinities, 
competent to punish the culprit; and in formulating precisely the facts to which the 
defendant had to swear. For example, as a baby the god Hermes stole Helios' cows and 
hid them in a cave. He could easily have sworn a deciding oath " I did not hide them at 
home".7 This would not have been a "straight" (ithys) oath but rather a "crooked" one 
(scholios horkos). Thus there was also a great deal of rationality in imposing the correct 
purgatory oath. 
5 Thür, Gerhard, "Zum dika=ei/1 bei Homer" 1970 ZRG RA 87: 426-444; see also Thür, Gerhard, "Die 
Todesstrafe im Blutprozess Athens. Z um dika=ein in IG I' 104 ; Dem. 23 , 22 ; Aristot. AP 57, 4" 
1990 Journal 0/ Ju/'istic PapY"ology 20: 143-156; Thür, Gerhard, "Oaths and Dispute Settlement 
in Ancient Greek Law" in : FoxhalllLewis (eds.), G/'eek Lal> in its Polilical Selling. Juslification 
nol Juslice Oxford , 1996: 57-72; Thür, Gerhard, " Der Reinigungseid im archaischen griechischen 
Rechtsstreit und seine Parallelen im Alten Orient" in: Rollinger/Barta/Lang (eds.), Rechtsgeschichle 
lind InterklillU/'alilät Wiesbaden, 2007: 179-195. 
6 Thür (n. 5) 2007 : 181-91 (and earlier); Sealey, Raphael , The JlIstice o/Ihe Greeks Ann Arbor, 1994: 
92, 101 , 119; Carawan, Edwin, Rhetol'ic and lhe Law 0/ Draco Oxford, 1998 : 57; Schmitz, Winfried, 
''' Drakonische Strafen.' Die Revision der Gesetze Drakons durch Sol on und die Blutrache in Athen" 
2001 Klio 83 : 7-38 at 27; Sommerstein, Alan H./Bayliss, Andrew J., Oath and State in Ancienl Greece 
BeriinIBoston, 2013 : 61, 115; pace e.g. Talamanca, Mario, ," Dika=ein ' e 'k/'inein' nelle testimonianze 
greche piu antiche" in : Biscardi (ed.), Symposion 1974 Köln, 1979: 103-133 at 106-117; Gagarin, 
Michael , "Oaths and Oath-Challenges in Greek Law" in : Thür/Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (eds.), 
Symposion 1995 Köln, 1997 : 125-134 at 131-133 ; Cantarella, Eva, " Modelli giurisdizionali omerici : 
il giudice unico, la giustizia dei vecchi" in : Cantarella/Thür (eds .), Symposion 1997 Köln, 200 I : 3-19 
at 13 (= Dil'illo e societa i/1 Grecia e Roma Milano, 2011: 151-169 at 163); Cantarella, Eva " Dispute 
Settlement in Homer: On ce Again on the Shield of Achilles" in : Melanges en I 'honnelll' PD. Dimakis 
Athens, 2002 : 147-165 at 159 (= Dil'illo e soeieta, see above, 2011: 171-1 9 1 at 183); Westbrook , 
Raymond, "The Trial Scene in the lIiad" 1992 Harvard Studies i/1 Classical Philology 94: 53-76 (= 
Law /rom the Tigl'is to the Tibel' I. Winoma Lake, IN ., 2009: 303-327) is less interested in procedure . 
7 Home/'ic Hym/1s 4.378-396. 
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I shall base my interpretation of Draco's law on these assumptions. There is only one 
problem: the law does not mention oaths at all. However, conclusions from later periods 
will help. I shall focus on lines 11-13. Before dealing with this text, I shall discuss the 
reason for Draco's legislation and the strange beginning with the use of the word Kai 
(and/even) in line 11 . 
1. Why did Draco enact his law on homicide? 
Did he intend, as is generally believed, to codify the homicide law ofhis times or did he 
respond - albeit in a quite general way - to real problems in Athenian society? I hold the 
second view.9 The law was a response to an actual historical situation. 
Let us have a look at the beginning of the first axon. IO I translate the preserved text 
with all its possible variations: "And when (or: even it) someone kills another without 
intention, he is exiled (or: he shall stand trial). The basileis ("kings," or at any rate 
magistrates) are to dikazein (for the moment I shall not translate this word) responsible 
for homicide ... (now, according to the stoichedon order ofthe inscription there is a gap 
of exactly seventeen letters) ... the person who was planning (conspiring or, preferably, 
advising, bouleuein). The ephetai (a board offifty-one dignitaries, not magistrates) are to 
diagnonai (again not translated)." The following text deals with the private pardoning of 
the killer (aidesis) by the victim's relatives after they have accepted blood money (poine). 
Provisions follow, regulating by what degree of kinship someone must be related to the 
victim in order to be entitled to file a private law suit, a dike phonou. In c1assical Athens, 
homicide was still a private matter, there being no public prosecution." 
From speeches made in Athenian courts,12 we know that in the lacuna in line 12, the 
alternative to bouleuein, however we translate it, must have been "killing by one's own 
hand ." Since the publication ofthe work ofHans Julius Wolff on the subject, this has been 
8 Recently Gagarin, Michael , Writing Greek Law Cambridge, 2008: 93-109, discussing earlier literature. 
9 Thür, Gerhard, "Gesetzeskodizes im archaischen und klassischen Athen" in: Melanges en I 'honneur 
PD. Dimakis (n. 6) : 631-640, following Humphreys, Sally, "A Historical Approach to Drakon's Law 
of Homicide" in : Gagarin (ed.), Symposion 1990 Köln, 1991 : 17-45 . 
10 IG I' 104, I 0-13 : &:x.crov· I Kai 'K [K1T[tvEI nva, ÖE 
aillo[ v] cpo[vo] E ... 17 ... E W]oAIEucravTO ' ölOyv[ö]ya[l]. [aiötcracrSOl 15' --- . 
11 MacDowell , Douglas M., Athenian Homicide Lmv in the Age olthe Orators Manchester, 1963: 8-32. 
12 Ant. 6.16: MEJ,lOpruPETOI IlEV ouv W 1tEpi TOU ii EyW Ulliv U1tEcrxollllv. aUTwv 
ÖE TOUTOOV crK01tEiv ä TE O\nOl Kai ii EYW, 1tOTEPOI UAl]6tcrTEpa Kai EUOpKOTEpa. 
öloollocravtO öE OUTOI IlEV u1toKTEivai llE t.lOÖOtOV ßouAEucravTO TOV SuvaTov, EYW öE U1tOKTEivOl, 
IlTiTE XElpi EpyamluEvoc (Dobree: UoauEvOC; mss.) IlTiTE ( 17) alTlwVTal öE OUtOl ... (You 
have heard the witnesses testify to the facts , gentlemen, as I promised you. From these you must 
examine what each side swore and decide which of us was more truthful and swore more correctly. 
They swore that I killed Diodotos by planning his death, but I swore I did not kill him either by my 
own hand nor by planning ... (Trans \. Gagarin in Gagarin, Michael/MacDowell, Douglas M., Antiphon 
and Andocides Austin TX, 1998, but see below n. 35)) and Andoc. 1.94: Kahm 0 Kai 
1tPOTEPOV ... TOV PouAEucravTO EV T0 at'n0 EvtXEcr6al Kai TOV Tii EpyaquUEVoV. (And the 
following law not only existed in the past ... "One who has planned an act shall be liable to the same 
penalty as one who cOlllmitted it with his own hand." (Trans\. MacDowell in Gagarin/MacDowell , 
above)). 
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beyond dispute,13 but it is still not certain what the exact words were that supplemented 
the seventeen missing letters. Bouleuein was an indirect way of killing, committed with 
and - as we shall see - without the intention of killing. 
This introduction was necessary in order to provide an explanation of Draco 's 
reasoning. Can a legislator, who wants to codify homicide law, begin his law code with 
"and"? And, moreover, would he start with unintentional killing? Scholars supporting 
the codification thesis have a possible explanation: Draco 's original law was amended; 
when the law was rewritten on stone in 409-408 B.C., it was no longer the ephelai 
who had to adjudge intentional homicide, but rather the council of the Areopagus. The 
original beginning of Draco's text was therefore omitted when the stone inscription was 
made. The word Kai (and) was copied by mistake.14 Ruschenbusch even reconstructed 
the wording of the supposedly cancelled beginning of the assumed "Iaw code"15 - in 
vain, 1 think. 
Stroud, on the other hand, holds that intentional killing was regulated in a later axon 
no longer legible on the stone; one cannot impute modern systematic thinking to an 
archaic lawgiver. Hence he translates Kai as "even if," a possible beginning of a law. 16 
Gagarin follows this translation, but disagrees with Stroud's systematic order. He thinks 
that intentional killing was not regulated in a later axon but rather "implicitly" - with the 
same consequences as unintentional killing. 17 Neither author is fully convincing. 
For my part, I follow the opposite view: for a century, some scholars have connected 
the alleged codification with a certain historical event, the sacrilege against the Cylonians, 
probably committed in the year 636 B.C., one generation be fore Draco.18 1 think one can 
explain the strange composition of Draco 's law as a response to this specific historical 
event. 19 
We have only legendary reports of the Cylonian sacrilege in Herodotus (5.71), 
Thucydides (1.126.11) and Plutarchus (Soion 12.1-3). It was also mentioned in Pausanias 
1.28.1. To sum up, Cylon (Kylon), an aristocrat who had been victorious in the Olympics, 
set out to rule Athens as a tyrant. After consulting the Delphic oracle and receiving the 
usual ambiguous response, he, together with a few accomplices, occupied the castle on 
the Acropolis. His adversaries incited the masses, besieged theAcropolis, and starved out 
the insurgents. Cylon escaped but in the meantime, his men were dying ofhunger in the 
temple of Athena Polias. Their death there would have meant that the sanctuary would be 
desecrated. Therefore, the Athenian archons under the Alcmaeonid Megacles (or some 
13 WollT, Hans Julius, " Der Ursprung des gerichtlichen Rechtsstreits bei den Griechen" in : Idem (ed.) 
Beiträge =111' Rechtsgeschichte Altgriechenlands lind des hellenistisch-römischen A"gypten Weimar, 
1961 : 1-90 at 67-70 (Eng!. : 1946 Traditio 4 : 31-85 at 71-73). 
14 Literature quoted in Thür (n. 5) 1990: 145 ; diITerently Westbrook, Raymond, " Drakon 's Homicide 
Law" in : HarrisffhOr (eds.), Symposion 2007 Wien, 2008 : 3-16. 
15 Ruschenbusch, Eberhard, Solon: Das Geset=eswerk - Fragmente. Überset=lIng lind Kommentar 
Stuttgart, 2010: 33 : " [Wenn jemand vorsätzlich einen anderen tötet, kann man mit ihm verfahren, wie 
man will, se in Besitz aber soll schutzlos sein,] und wenn jemand jemanden unvorsätz lich tötet .... " 
16 Strolld (n. 4) 1968: 34-40. 
17 Gagarin, Michael, Drakol1 and Early Athenian Homicide Law New HavenlLondon, 1981 : 98-102. 
18 Humphreys (n. 9) 1991 : 41-45 ; Thür (n. 9) 2002 (and forthcoming, see n. 2) with flIrther references . 
19 Thür (n. 9) 2002. 
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such name) promised the rebels safe conduct to leave the country. The failing insurgents 
knotted a woollen thread to the statue of the goddess and under her magic protection 
"roped" down their way from the castle. Unfortunately and significantly, at the shrine of 
the Erinnyes the thread broke. Because the goddess had withdrawn her protective hand, 
Megacles ordered that the supplicants be seized and put to trial. However, before this 
could happen the crowd stoned the Cylonians, some of whom were even slaughtered at 
the altars. After that, Athens fell into a crisis ofblood feuds between aristocratic families, 
which ended only under Draco's regime. 
I see the connection between the sacrilege against the Cylonians and Draco's law in 
the strange beginning of the text. It seems to fit the historical situation exactly. Firstly, 
unintentional killing (IlE ' K [n]povoiuC;): Megacles and his fellow-archons could assert, 
when they had ordered the seizure of the rebels, they had not intended that they be 
killed. Draco 's answer was: even if you killed unintentionally, you will be exiled. At 
that time exile was the only consequence of killing aperson. Secondly, indirect killing 
([ß] oAlw<Juv'tu): the archons could assert further that they had not killed because they 
didn't act "with their own hands". Draco answered : even those who gave the order or 
"advised" a measure resulting in the death ofthe rebels, are responsible for the homicide. 
One generation after the sacrilege, Draco, through his statute, enabled the law courts 
to exile the main culprits in the long lasting crisis and pardon the minor culprits. One 
may trace the strange order in which unintentional indirect killing received precedence 
in a law on homicide to the political situation at that time, No legislator, drawing up an 
abstract law code, would invent such a case. 
One can explain also the following paragraphs in the light ofthe historical situation. 
Draco enumerated the group of relatives competent to pardon the killer, which was 
necessary to pacify the polis. Because blood feuds had even led to the extinction of some 
families, Draco ordered that ten men chosen from the victim'sphratria (members ofthe 
broader family cult) could pardon (grant aidesis to) a culprit when there were no other 
more competent relatives, but only ifthe culprit had killed unintentionally (akon, 11. 16-
9). This was the only reference to unintentional killing. Generally, the same sanction was 
imposed for both intentional and unintentional killing: exile.20 Later, Solon introduced 
the death penalty for intentional killing and also permitted the Areopagus, instead ofthe 
ephetai, to judge certain murder cases. 21 
2. Homicide trials and oaths 
Dealing with the oaths, admittedly not mentioned in the text, means having to restore the 
seventeen m issing letters in line 12. 
Firstly, however, two textual problems must quickly be solved. In line 11, pheugein 
can only mean "to be exiled", not "to stand trial" as Phillips and Pepe recently held ,zz 
20 Gagarin(n 17) 1981 : 101. 
21 Thür (n. 5) 1990. 
22 Phillips, David D., Avengers 01 Blood. Homicide in Alhenion Lall' and Cl/slom Imm Draco 10 
Demostllenes Stuttgart, 2008 : 50-51 with 74; and Pepe, Laura, Phonos. L 'omicidio da Draconte 
all 'eta degli oralori Milano, 2012 : 22-28. 
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY IN THE ANCIENT GREEK LAW OF PROCEDURE 921 
Normally, a man accused of killing sought shelter from the relatives ' legitimate blood 
revenge in a sanctuary. There he could either deny having committed the act and 
stand trial , or confess and take the safe path into exileY Abroad, he was safe from any 
persecution (11. 26-29). Draco 's first sentence is therefore a substantive, not a procedural 
rule. 
The third sentence can also be explained easily (I. 13): TO<; OE €q>üa<; owyv[o]ya[l]. 
In lines 18-19 the ephetai are also called the "Fifty-one." In classicaI Athens, apart from 
the Areopagus, a board of fifty-one citizens still decided homicide cases.24 The odd 
figure of fifty-one proves that from Draco's time onwards, diagnonai meant "deciding 
by votes." Because bIood revenge was then Iegitimate, one can be sure that the ephetai 
voted secretIy to avoid revenge that the culprit 's relatives might take. The vote was 
"guilty" or "not guiIty" regarding the alternative claims "killing with one's own hand" 
or "by advising" expressed in the second sentence (I. 12). Only in the rare cases where 
a killer was pardoned, not sentenced, did the ephetai vote on whether the killing was 
"unintentionaI" or " intentional".H 
Now we come to the crucial question: what is the dikazein of the basileis of lines 11-
12? The persons making up the basileis are quite clear; not so the act of dikazein. 
In classical Athens the nearest relative ofa victim filed a private dike phonou with the 
archon basileus (the "king" archont), one of the nine highest magistrates. His province 
was sacred atfairs, including lawsuits concerning bloodshed. Depending on the category 
into which the deed fell, the basileus passed the claim on to the court of the ephetai, 
sitting at different sanctuaries, or to the Areopagus.26 Before the trial , the plaintiff 
and the defendant as weil as their witnesses had to swear the "greatest and strongest" 
most reverend oath, the diomosia (Ant. 5.11 , Dem . 23.67-68) .21 In Draco's time, the 
basileis were magistrates. Stroud explained the plural as referring to the annual change 
ofmagistrates. 28 The beUer view is that the plural comprises the archon basileus ofthe 
polis together with the four phylobasileis ofthe old Attic phylai, who in classical Athens 
still had an inferior role in cases of bloodshed.29 
What was the dikazein done by these five basileis? In the huge literature about Draco, 
there is no satisfying answer. One must not transfer the terminology of classical Athenian 
procedure into archaic times. Later, dikazein and gignoskein were synonyms, both 
meaning the law courts' "deciding." However, in Draco's law the court of the ephetai 
was deciding by dignonai. Therefore, the basileis cannot do the same thing. With some 
juristic plausibility, Wolffholds that dikazein means "pronouncing" the verdict rendered 
23 This topic is discussed by Schmitz (n. 6) 200 I : 25-26. 
24 MacDowell (n. 11 ) 1963 : 56; Harri son, A.R.W. , The Law 0/ Athens 1/: Procedure Oxford, 1971: 39-
42 ; concerning Draco, see Carawan (n. 6) 1998: 71 . 
25 Pace Ruschenbusch(n. 15)20 10: 19; Carawan (n. 6) 1998 : 70, 81 ; Pepe(n. 22)2012 : 77. 
26 MacDowell (n. 11) 1963 : 37-38. 
27 SommersteiniBayliss (n. 6) 2013 : 113-115. 
28 Stroud (n. 4) 1968 : 47. 
29 Pepe (n. 22) 2012 : 32-33 with further references. 
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by the ephetaUO But why is Draco speaking first of pronouncing and then of rendering 
the sentence? And were five magistrates necessary just for pronouncing a verdict? 
I also cannot agree with Ruschenbusch, who thinks that in every homicide trial firstiy 
the basileis decided what the facts were (dikazein): in other words, whether the defendant 
had killed or not; and that then the ephetai voted on the question of subjective intention 
(diagnonai). 31 However, voting about intention was exceptional and foreseen only in the 
rare cases ofpardoning by the members ofthephratria. 
In my opinion my late German colleagues were wrong, but their opinions at least 
made sense. I have a notion that some of our contemporary American colleagues do 
not pay much attention to the juristic problems. In 1981 Gagarin (at xv-xvi) seemed to 
follow Wolff: "judge the case" ofthe ephetai is contrasted with "adjudge responsible" of 
the basileis, which probably means "pronounce." In his book published in 2008 (at 96) I 
see no differentiation from the legal point ofview between "judge guilty" (dikazein) and 
"decide" (diagnonai) .32 
To my mind, dikazein must be seen in a completely different way. It belongs to the 
" introductory step" of the trial. 33 With reference to my studies on legal procedure in 
Homeric times, I compare Draco's dikazein ofthe seventh century with the "conditional 
verdict" delivered in other archaic Greek societies. In both the I-Iomeric trial scenes, on 
the shield of Achilles (11. 18.497-508) and after the chariot race (11. 23.579-585), the 
court - the gerontes or the hegemones - did not pronounce on gui It, but rather formulated 
purgatory oaths. It was then up to the defendant to get acquitted by swearing the oath 
imposed on him, or to confess his guilt when he did not dare perjure himself. 34 
This model may help explaining the dikazein in Draco's archaic law. Indeed, in 
Athenian homicide trials in c1assical times oaths were sworn, the diomosiai previously 
mentioned.35 The defendant was no longer allowed to swear a decisive purgatory oath, 
but both the plaintiff and defendant and their witnesses had to affirm through the most 
horrible oaths wh ether the defendant had killed or not. These oaths were taken in court 
and also before the magistrate, the basileus, during the preparatory, pre-trial sessions 
called prodikasiai. In other private lawsuits, these sessions were called anakrisis. Already 
the word prodikasia suggests the dikazein of Draco's basileis. 
Antphon's sixth speech, on (he Choreutes, from 419 B.C., makes matters abundantly 
c1ear. In those times the diomosiai were still formulated according to the ancient 
Draconic law, and we find the restoration of line 12 of the inscription. The leader of a 
choir, a choregos, had had to train a boys' choir for a festival. His agent administered 
a dangerous pharmakon to one of the boys, the choreutes Diodotus, to improve his 
voice. The boy died. Like Megacles, mentioned above, the choregos was charged with 
bouteuein, advising, without inlending to kill. From the wording ofthe diomosiai quoted 
in section 16, one may draw conclusions on the lost wording of the second sentence in 
30 Wolff (n. 13) 196 1: 74 (1946: 75); Talamanca (n. 6) 1979: 130 agreed . 
31 Ruschenbusch (n. 15) 20 I 0: 19. 
32 In the same way Phillips (n. 22) 2008 : 49-50. 
33 Suggested al so by Cantarella, Eva, SI1Idi s1I11 'omicidio in diritlo g l'eco e /"Omano Milano, 1976: 90-91 . 
34 For references, see above n. 6. 
35 See above n. 27. 
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Draco's law, the alternative to bouleuein: "You have heard the witnesses testify to the 
facts, gentlemen, as I promised you. From these you must examine what each side swore 
and decide which of us swore more truthfully and more purely. They swore that [ killed 
Diodotos by advising (the cause for) his death, but [ swore I did not kill hirn either by my 
own hand or by advising."36 
The plaintiff swore that the accused choregos had killed Diodotus by advising, 
bouleuein. The choregos denied each alternative: [ did not kill hirn either with my own 
hand or in an indirect way. These were precisely the alternatives covered in 1.12 ofDraco's 
law. To find the supplement to the lacuna I think we need the verb etvUl proposed by 
Ruschenbusch and Gagarin: q>oy[o] cTval. Then, [ think, further supplementing 
TOV tpyam1llEvoV (Gagarin 1981 : xv) is because . .. ]E [ß]oAlwaavTU is without an 
article too. Up to now Ruschenbusch 's supplement has seemed the best,37 but [ would 
suggest a better word for alJTOXEp, "with one's own hands." When we look c10sely at the 
Antiphon editions we find that XElpi tpyaaullEvo<; (Dobree: apullEvo<; mss.) is a conjecture. 
Most editors of the Antiphon speeches were not able to explain the word apullEvo<; (to 
raise, lift) with an indirect object XElPi. They corrected it to tpyaaallEvo<; according to 
Andocides 1.9438 who quoted another, more recent statute. For Antiphon 6, Wilamowitz 
stayed with apullEvo<; translating " [ did not kill hirn with my hand, having raised it" .39 
Staying with Antiphon's words, not with his syntax, we also have the supplement ofline 
12: ö]IIKU(;EV OE TO<; ßaatMa<; q>oy[o] E'rval E xEioa apuuEvoV] E [ß]oAlwaavTU.40 
In translation (and interpretation): "The basileis are to order (the plaintiffs to swear): ' he 
(the relevant defendant) is responsible for killing' (now the alternative folIows) either 
' having raised the hand (himseit) ' or 'having advised (the cause for ones death) '." This 
statute, enacted for the special case of the slaughter against the Cylonians, continued to 
be the basic provision about bloodshed in Athens until classical times . . 
[n this interpretation, dikazein must be understood in its archaic sense: imposing an 
oath. However, Draco did not impose only one oath, and the verdict was not a conditional 
one. Rather we may assurne that the verdict was delivered by the votes of the ephetai, 
36 Text quoted above in n. 12; I changed some crucial tenns in Gagarin's translation. 
37 Ruschenbusch (n. 15) 2010: 30: ah'lo[v] q>oy[o] ElvOl EhE a\J10XEp Eh]E [ß]oA!woaVta. 
38 Quoted above in n. 12. 
39 Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich, "Die sechste Rede des Antiphon" in : SB AkW Berlin Berlin, 
1900: 398-416 at 401 n. I = Kleine Schriften III, Berlin, 1969: 196-217 at 199) following Vahlen, 
Johannes, "Prooimium indice lectionum aestivarum 1879 praemissum" Berlin, 1879: 10 non vidi (= 
Opuscula Academica I, Berlin, 1907, repr. Hildesheim, 1967 : 77-87 at 85 ), who quoted the parallel 
Ant. 5.92: XElpi c:t7tOKtEivn . 
40 First suggested by Thür (n. 5) 1990: 152 (restoring XElpi; in n. 42 the writing XElp- is explained), 
consenting Meleze Modrzejewski, Joseph, " La sanction de I' homicide en droit grec et he llenistique" 
in : Gagarin (ed.), Symposion 1990 Köln, 1991 : 3-16 at 7 (= Droil el jl/slice dans le monde grec el 
hellenistiql/e Warsaw, 20 I I : 2 I 1-231 at 2 I 8). After discussions at the Insti tute for Advanced Study in 
Princeton NJ in March 2014 I think Draco, in a more si mple language, wrote the direct object xEipa 
as e.g. used in Arist. Rhet. I 374a35: EUV E1tixPlltal n]v XEipa and sti ll found in a "confession 
inscription" of Asia Minor, Petzl, Georg, Epigl: Anatol. 22,1994, no. 44: 
I thank my colleagues Angelos Chaniotis, Christopher Jones and Emmanuel Voutiras for a helpful 
discussion. 
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which from Draco 's times onwards determined which side swore "more truthfully and 
more purely", as Antiphon characterized the method about 200 years later. 
3. Rationality 
Draco's dikazein is rooted in the archaic way of settling disputes by purgatory oaths, 
which we would call irrational. However, imposing a double oath and having a panel of 
judges decide which one to believe, points to future rational adjudication.41 Eventually 
the art of rhetoric gave the parties more and more opportunity to use rational arguments 
and convince the judges of their case. Even today, the part played by Greek practical 
legal thinking in promoting rational court sentences, which still form part of our legal 
culture, has not been acknowledged. 
Nevertheless, I do not overrate Draco's rationality. From the archaic point of view, 
the double oath method could be explained as folIows : one did not wait for the person 
who had sworn a false purgatory oath to be punished by the offended god. Rather, in a 
type of ordeal, one let the god hirnself speak through the judges' votes on the double 
oath. One ofthe oaths had to be false. Technically speaking, by doubling the oath Draco 
deprived it of its decisive force; by adding a decisive "ordeal" he amazingly raised the 
sentence to a more objective, rational level. This simple and still irrational procedural 
method was the origin of what we term rational adjudication in Greece. 
Abstract 
The paper deals with what today we would call rational and irrationai procedural methods 
in Greek adjudication in archaic times. In Draco 's law of homicide dating back to 621-
620 B.C., I see the first known move from deciding the outcome of a case by imposing 
purgatory oaths towards voting by a panel of judges. Although deciding on the proper 
wording of a purgatory oath demanded a great deal of legal experience on the part of 
the state authorities, the outcome of the trial depended on the irrational decision of the 
culprit himselfto brave the wrath ofthe gods ifhe committed perjury. In Draco's law we 
find , firstly, the method of imposing contrary oaths (diomosiai) on each litigant (which 
explains the dikazein ofthe officials, the basileis). It was therefore not the oaths that were 
decisive, but the vote ofthe fifty-one ephetai who decided which oath was the better one. 
The party who won the case was the one best able to persuade the judges, and in this 
way, reasoning achieved a new level. This was the origin of the more rational c1assical 
Athenian procedurallaw. In this sense, I restored the text in the much disputed lacuna in 
IG P 104.12 from the diomosiai mentioned in An!. 6.16. 
41 For a different explanation see Berneker, Erich, " Der Ursprung des doppelten Parteieneides im 
altgriechischen Verfahrensrecht" in : Sy nteleia Vincen=o Arang io RlIi= Napol i, 1964 : 743-749. 
